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Abstract
A portable device user, Alice, is travelling and wishes to get local information on points of interest (e.g. restaurants,
hotels) from a location based service, but without a violation of her privacy. Furthermore, Alice wishes to maintain a
presence at home. We present a system that allows a local user, either at her destination or in her home city, to act as
a relay for Alice without revealing her identity either to the relay or to the location based service. The system relies
on a central server and implements a reputation system to reward relays.
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1. Introduction
We have recently seen the proliferation of services based on location1, thanks to the common availability of smart
phones, most often equipped with GPS. Yet concerns still abound about their safe use. We consider a portable device
user, Alice, who uses a smartphone to locate nearby Points of Interest (POIs) through a query—for example, restaurant
recommendations in the vicinity of her location—to a Location Based Server (LBS). The LBS server returns POIs
from its database that match the query.
Alice is concerned however that such a request might lead to revealing her location, or leaving some information
on her device that could be traced to her location. Her request has to be local in order to blend in. Furthermore, some
services and information may be available only locally. At a technical level this means her IP address must plausibly
match her GPS location. In addition, Alice wants to make queries from her home IP so her home geographic location
matches the IP originating those queries. These requests would follow a pattern of typical queries she make on a daily
basis (e.g. for weather, or local sports scores). These requests would be conﬁned to popular websites, however, to
avoid volunteering too much speciﬁc and identifying information about Alice.
Email addresses: gregoire@emt.inrs.ca (Jean-Charles Gre´goire), ahamel@wlu.ca (Ange`le M. Hamel)
1Say, Foursquare, Gowalla, Loopt, among many others.
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Therefore, Alice would like to browse the website anonymously, not alerting it to the fact she is in a particular
location. But, because she is a frequent visitor to the site and orders from it online, it has cookies on her machine,
and provides her with recommended products every time she accesses the website from her device. If she deletes the
cookies to preserve her privacy, she loses this history and the future recommendations.
More formally, Alice wants to make GPS-based requests to a Location Based Service for information about
Points of Interest without violating her privacy and revealing her identity to the Location Based Service. There are
two classical approaches to this problem: enlarge the set of users making the query (k-anonymity) [1], [2], [3] or
enlarge the area for making the request (location cloaking) [4], [5]. Our system, ALPINe (Another Location Privacy
Information Network), takes a diﬀerent approach, relaying the request through another local user. Just as important,
our system also allows Alice to pretend to still be at home.
We consider that the nature of the query is not something Alice is hiding (e.g. it is not something illegal or
conﬁdential or embargoed). It is her relation to her current location she is hiding, and the fact the query is tied to her
in particular. However, she must be careful not to include her name or other identifying information such as credit
card numbers or friends’ addresses in the request.
This paper is structured as follows. The following section elaborates risks and elements of trust. In section 3 we
present the architecture of ALPINe and discuss key elements of its implementation in section 4. Section 5 presents
related work. In section 6 we review and discuss key elements of ALPINe in terms of security and performance.
Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Risks, Trust and Threat Model
Part of the diﬃculty of location hiding is the possible connection between three elements: information exchanged,
location, and identity. If location information is not acquired directly from the infrastructure or volunteered by the
user, it might still possibly be acquired indirectly through the correlation of diﬀerent elements.
2.1. Stack Information Leakage
Link layer. Layer 2 protocols require devices to have identiﬁers—sometimes abusively called “MAC addresses.”
These identiﬁers are used to discriminate between diﬀerent communications in a shared environment, but can also be
used to identify users as they are associated with a speciﬁc user.
Devices connected to the Internet using cellular technology use mechanisms which strongly identify them—and
thus their owner through registration—to an Internet service provider (ISP). The ISP has full latitude to identify its
customers, track them, and even monitor their communications, but there are strong restrictions on the use of such
information.
Mobile devices have other identiﬁers related to various communication technologies (bluetooth, WiFi), but they
can be disabled or spoofed easily. A WiFi hotspot will thus allow someone to connect more anonymously to the
Internet.
Network layer. An IP address is required to communicate across the Internet. They are allocated from a pool owned
by a Service Provider using mechanisms which do not concern us here. More important is the fact that the address
can lead to geographical identiﬁcation, although with less precision than given by the previous techniques, e.g. city
or region wide.
The IP address cannot be directly related to a speciﬁc user, unless some form of authentication has been used to
acquire it. Then again, the ISP would know it, but not necessarily know which actions were performed from that
address.
Application layer. Unlike the previous cases, the application layer only has information volunteered by Alice. It can
be of two natures: objective, such as GPS coordinates, and subjective, e.g. “the Starbucks closest to the train station.”
This information is of little relevance per se, unless it can directly be related to Alice; that is, be associated with her
identity. However, we must note that this information can be corroborated by the IP address used by Alice.
Objective information is commonly used nowadays since many mobile terminals have a built-in GPS receiver.
Furthermore GPS coordinates can be automatically “grabbed” from the device and sent to a service such as a social
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network where they become part of the user’s status. Finally, many social networks now implicitly cross-feed status
information.
Finally, Web cookies can be an issue. They keep track of information speciﬁc to Alice and her surﬁng practices,
and provide strong hints as to her whereabouts. We look into this speciﬁc issue next.
2.2. Web Issues
HTTP, the transport protocol of the Internet, is a stateless protocol; that is, each request sent by the client is
processed independently and the server is not supposed to hold a memory of previous requests. This creates some
limitations in functionality and very early mechanisms were introduced to try to circumvent this shortcoming.
Tracing the user’s session indeed brings many beneﬁts. Within a session, for example, it is possible to maintain
contextual information, as simple as a language choice. Between sessions, user preferences such as favourite news
topics can also be monitored. Such features can actually be valued by customers of, say, Amazon or Indigo who are
proposed items based on their purchase—or simply browsing—history, thereby enriching their shopping experience.
These mechanisms are of various natures: cookies (rfc 2965), session identiﬁers or state variables. They can be
embedded in the browser, on the page, or even within the URI. Various considerations guide the use of the mechanism:
the existence of a login (authentication) process, the need to keep information through a visit, or over multiple visits.
Cookies are a preferred method in general.
Cookies complement the operations of HTTP with a simple convention: the server can ask the browser to hold a
piece of information, and ask the browser to send it with every request. This eﬀectively adds a state to the client, which
persists across sessions. Some authors have even proposed more extended forms of cookies which take advantage of
various storage mechanisms oﬀered by more contemporary standards and browser extensions, i.e. 2
• Standard HTTP Cookies
• Local Shared Objects (Flash Cookies)
• Storing cookies in RGB values of auto-generated, force-cached PNGs using HTML5 Canvas tag to read pixels
(cookies) back out
• Storing cookies in Web History
• HTML5 Session, Local or Global Storage
• HTML5 Database Storage via SQLite
There are, however, also downsides to the use of cookies. As Web pages nowadays contain content from multiple
sources, including advertisement companies, it has become possible to track users across multiple web sites simply
by having cookies from the same domain embedded through diﬀerent sites.
Blocking cookies or erasing them between sessions, two alternatives oﬀered to the user, are only partial solutions
to some of these issues, but they have drawbacks of their own. First, some web sites will not operate correctly with
cookies disabled. Second, erasing cookies after a browsing session means losing some history, and does not solve the
tracking problem at the session level. Third, manipulating cookies selectively can be extremely cumbersome, as some
sites use a large number of them, even for their own content.
We propose that the use of cookies can still be beneﬁcial and must be allowed, but we need to conﬁne them
within a speciﬁc context. Alice has a choice of choosing a speciﬁc context when she surfs the Web, with three clear
possibilities: a local context, a touring context and a home context.
3. A System Model
We present an infrastructure which allows Alice to pretend she is still at home and also allows her to access
location-based information, while hiding the fact she is roaming; that is, using some other identity, legitimate for the
geographic area.
2from http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/www-tag/2010Sep/0038.html, last accessed April 3rd, 2011.
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ALPINe’s foundation consists in relaying Alice’s requests for information. The principle is ﬁrst to disconnect
Alice’s requests from her terminal, then to link them to a terminal from the geographic region so that they will be
part of a normal—regionally speaking, that is—pattern. We use a server-based system to support the discovery and
communication with relays. The relays are themselves users of the system: they can oﬀer relay services when they
are at home, and use others’ services when travelling/roaming.
3.1. Architecture
We use a well-known server in the cloud to allow Alice to discover a possible relay. This server 1) accepts
registration of nodes within some geographic area which can oﬀer the relay service; 2) takes requests from nodes who
want to ﬁnd a relay and oﬀer them a selection; and 3) acts as a mediator between the two of them as required.
Because the potential for abuse is high, we add the following constraints: 1) Registration is required. People
subscribe to the relay service and register a pseudonym, so there is a form of control on who can join; 2) Reputation is
maintained. Users give feedback on their use of the service and their fellow participants in the transactions; 3) Limited
information. The server only provides a short list of random oﬀers for relay.
The relays come from a peer-based system, which is essentially a community of users exchanging favours. A user
may agree to be part of this community out of altruism, out of a desire to get around a third party system (that is trying
to violate Alice’s privacy) and hence “beat the system,” to return the favour (since he or she could also beneﬁt from
the system when he or she is roaming), or to proﬁt from a reward system in which the user collects points for each
message relayed.
Note that the local user could be a static machine or a mobile device but that locality would be enforced with
network timing information, e.g. ping, traceroute. Note also that the LBS itself cannot be a relay because it is, in all
likelihood, not local.
3.2. Information Management
Alice must be able to isolate three diﬀerent Web state contexts we have mentioned above. Note that, by context,
we mean state information, typically cookies as discussed above, which can be used to track or identify her.
The home context. It has the information used for her regular surﬁng at home, the sites she visits on a regular basis,
say for her mail and social interactions.
The casual-roaming context. It is used to make local, non-LBS and non history-based queries, such as weather, but
also to look at local stores.
This context can be destroyed once Alice leaves the city.
The anonymous-roaming context. It is used for LBS queries based on her current location.
Let us note that the distinction between casual and anonymous roaming is not strictly necessary, but is interesting
to consider for eﬃciency purposes: casual roaming can be done by Alice herself, on her own device while anonymous
roaming must be relayed.
To support such context management, diﬀerent techniques are possible. All contexts must be kept separate from
each other. One could imagine using three diﬀerent browsers, each managing the relevant context, but of course these
browsers cannot all run on Alice’s device—certainly her home-based surﬁng must be done remotely, from her home
location.
Virtualization is a simple way to achieve this, but possibly at high operations cost. The most straightforward way
of implementing these remote operations is through infrastructure virtualization, which means that the browser would
be running on a diﬀerent machine—the relay’s—and accessed remotely through some remote terminal protocol, e.g.
RDP or VNC-like. However, another drawback of this approach is that it does not suppose the reputation system
we have proposed. The proposed model requires that relay be able to monitor the requests made and traditional
approaches to virtualization do not meet this requirement.
We propose instead that the functions of the browser be broken down in two parts: on the relay we have context
management and the protocol engine, whereas on Alice’s machine we only have visualization.
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This perspective is actually in line with contemporary web technology. Consider, for example, the WebKit2
technology 3 an evolution of the technology used by Google Chrome and Apple Safari. It introduces a separation
between the Web processing functions and the user interface process. The goal of the designers is to isolate processing
from presentation by running these functions in diﬀerent processes, thereby improving the security of the browser.
We adapt this model further by running the processes on diﬀerent machines: Alice has the UI and the relay has the
web process, which includes state manipulation.
Beyond its security beneﬁts, as well as intrinsic support for our purpose, this structure also results in a simple UI
which will run easily on small devices and possibly also integrated in a mobile browser.
4. Implementation
Relays
...
Montreal RegionToronto Region
...
Root
Server
Regional servers
Fig. 1: Global perspective.
The implementation of ALPINe includes the following elements:
• relay discovery,
• connection,
• operations.
We sketch them in broad terms below. To simplify presentation, we assume we have a hierarchical server infrastructure
but do not discuss the issues of implementing such a hierarchy for which traditional solutions apply.
4.1. Practical matters
We use port 443 (https) to set up credentials. The connection must be secured minimally to protect the credentials,
a pseudonym and a password. A TLS session meets these requirements.
We use port 80 (http) for other communications, even though we may not be using HTTP to carry our information.
TCP connections are set up from the relay or Alice as requested—this is discussed in more detail below.
3See http://trac.webkit.org/wiki/WebKit2, last accessed April 3rd, 2011.
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4.2. Relay discovery
Fig. 1 presents the overall service structure. We assume that all users of this service are authenticated by the root
server before any operation can be performed. They register as relays or users—or possibly as both, since Alice can use
a home computer to act as her relay. As we have discussed previously, the service infrastructure can be decentralized,
with a number of high-level servers and regional secondary servers. Users and relays are tagged geographically to
allow easy search. Availability information and requests are redirected from the root server to the regional servers.
Mechanisms for authentication and authorization are typical of any web-based services and not diﬀerent here.
Access to the secondary server is allowed only once authentication by the root server has been performed, and for a
limited period of time. A session token easily supports this model.
4.3. Relay registration
The regional servers essentially maintain presence information on the relays: IP address, and availability. We
use a classical “soft state” model for this information, as we actually do throughout this project: it is up to the relay
to refresh its presence information at regular intervals. This refresh is done by transmitting a session token over a
channel secured with the session key periodically.
During the original connection, an attempt will be made by the server to connect to a port announced by the relay
with the TCP protocol, to help detect whether the relay is behind some restrictive network box (i.e. NAT, Firewall).
If the latter proves to be the case, the relay will open a TCP connection to the server, based on a port the server will
have announced, and will keep that connection open to receive information (i.e. requests) from the server.
The regional server(s) keep(s) information on the relays available, their location (announced and checked based
on their IP address), their IP address, session description, and whether it is possible to connect to them directly or not.
The following is an example of a relay–server exchange.
-> Connection setup (root server, pseudonym,
credentials, location, "relay")
<- OK(session token, session id, number, server)
/ Reject
<- close
-> Connection setup (server, session token, port)
<- connection attempt
<- OK(connection succeeded)
/NOK(connection failed, port)
-> OVER / Connection setup
<- Connection ACKED
-> OVER
Connection teardown
If the exchange is successful, the relay will be able to periodically open a connection to update its presence status.
The communication channel would be used to relay requests only and is not used for control/status information.
The relay also reports changes in its activity status for load balancing purposes.
4.4. Client-Relay communications
Following her request, Alice is oﬀered a number of relays in her geographic region of interest and she can pick any
of them, or even several, for her communications. She establishes a session with them either directly, or indirectly,
through a regional server if there are connectivity restrictions as discussed above.
Fig. 2 shows how Alice’s web request is processed and relayed to the target server through a relay.
Alice’s registration process mirrors that of the relay. We can also ﬁnd out whether or not she can be reached by a
TCP connection attempt or not. In either case Alice will send her request to the relay, which will originate it, collect
the answer and pass it back to her. Alice sends an HTTP request and gets the HTTP answer, which is displayed to her
via her browser, or a built-in browser of the application, depending on the nature of the support platform.
According to the scenario chosen, the server may need to communicate with the relay to let it know to try to
communicate with Alice. The channel opened for server communications will be used in that case.
Alice will receive an acknowledgment for her request, in case it fails, or the answer.
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+ Web credentials
Web ProcessUI Process
Alice Bob Server
Request + GPS data
Web Request
Web Answer
Filtered Page
Display Data
Web Server
Fig. 2: Operations steps
4.5. Speciﬁc issues
The home relay. Alice’s home relay is a special case, as it does not need to be discovered, but only associated with
her, if it exists. We suppose that a special registration is made for a “personal relay,” and Alice has access to her
personal relay at any time. Furthermore, Alice can register her server as public, or strictly private. Nevertheless, as
there can be communication restrictions, she must connect to her home relay through a regional server.
Reputation. Alice is requested to perform a reputation assessment at the end of her session. The same would apply
for the relay although we take a more passive approach in this case, since the relay may be busy with several clients.
We rather assume that the relay will be compelled to report Alice if her behaviour has been inappropriate.
Relays are not informed of the current reputation status of Alice’s. This information remains with the root server
and can be used to bar Alice if necessary.
Conﬁdentiality. As we have assumed that Alice does not do anything illegal, we have not looked at means to secure
communications between Alice and relay. While it is possible to encrypt communications between them, they would
be open to a man-in-the-middle attack from a regional relay acting as a connector between them.
Load sharing. We have not speciﬁed how many sessions a relay could carry simultaneously nor the mechanisms to
share its information with the regional servers. This is a classical problem and does not present major diﬃculties as
long as we can decide when Alice’s session is over. Our current model uses limited time allocations (leases), which
Alice would need to renew.
Alice’s Browser. There may be practical issues with the deployment of the UI component of the split-browser on
Alice’s portable device. We plan to embed it within a standard browser to alleviate this problem.
We should also mention that we can also support app-like LBS applications this way, simply by re-implementing
them within a browser.
5. Related Work
Traditional approaches to location privacy operate by diluting the observable eﬀect of the user. One popular
approach is diluting the user’s presence socially through a version of k-anonymity. The technique of k-anonymity is
imported from the database realm, and the basic premise is that the user should be indistinguishable from k − 1 other
proximate users [6], [3], [7], [2]. A second approach involves diluting the user’s presence spatially by enlarging the
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area the user queries—some version of spatial cloaking [8], [7], [3], [6]—or by providing false locations [9], [10].
Either type of dilution can be accomplished by a central authority (trusted third party) [7], [3], [6] who cloaks an area
or redirects queries, or by a peer-to-peer conﬁguration where the users themselves organize themselves into k-sized
groups, or administer their own cloaks [1], [2], [11], [12], [13], [14].
Our approach does not employ dilution, or rather it exploits the natural dilution of IP address distribution. Instead
the user’s query is relayed by another user.
Our system is in the same category as many other low-latency anonymity systems (see Edman et al. [15] for a
survey of such systems) in that it uses a relay. However, while it shares this approach with Crowds [16], Tarzan [17],
and MorphMix [18], there are a number of key diﬀerences. Our system partitions users into two distinct groups—
senders and locals—and only one of the two groups does the relaying. Further, the relay is only a single hop, and
there is no attempt to disguise that it is a relay. We have a server administering the procedure and governing discovery,
although on a practical level some of the communication happens in a peer–to–peer fashion, i.e. directly between Alice
and relay if possible.
6. Discussion
A number of issues with the system exist and need to be addressed or responded to. Below are some issues we
have identiﬁed. We distinguish security issues from performance issues.
6.1. Security
Availability. The system has two disjoint sets of users: the senders, who want their location concealed, and the locals,
who are willing to act as relays for senders. One potential problem with the system is if there would be no relay in the
vicinity. In that case Alice must wait, go ahead without a relay (with the ensuing loss of privacy) or potentially ask
the server to relay it for her. This will conceal her location but not necessarily appear to be a local request.
Trust. The service can track Alice’s current location as well as her activities when her communications with a relay
must be provided by a regional server. We must note also that regional servers can lie about the possibility of reaching
a relay directly. We revisit this problem below.
Overall, there would be trust in the service because breaches could easily be denounced through social networks.
Alice. In some ways, Alice can be her own worst enemy. The way she uses the Internet can be summarized in a
signature which can be used to identify her. This however requires a signiﬁcant eﬀort to collect and analyze data.
Whereas Alice’s ISP could do it, she could be using a diﬀerent ISP while roaming.
Conﬁdentiality. How secure are Alice-Relay communications?
Let us imagine that, through the server, the relay announces a public key, which is transmitted to Alice along with
the relay information. This public key is used by Alice to send a session key to relay, which is then used for the
exchanged of data between the two. We can therefore hide the content of that communication.
This mechanism is weak, however when the server is used to “hairpin” communications between Alice and her
relay: there is a clear opportunity for a MiM (AKA bucket brigade) attack, since the server provides the key, as
supplied by relay and could insert itself in the communications. Using a covert channel or a Diﬃe-Hellman model
can be imagined and other proposals do actually make assumptions of that nature, but it is not easy to do in practice,
short of providing some means for Alice to make local contact with a potential relay.
The server is intrinsically the weak link in this model. However, since the issue is to hide location information
from marketers, Alice will very quickly ﬁnd out if her location has been revealed.
6.2. Performance
Latency and computation costs are the dominant performance issues of our proposal.
Latency. Any anonymity system introduces some degree of latency and ours is no exception. It is however simply
restricted to the relay model, that is, the use of a communication hop, rather than the use of cryptographic means.
Furthermore, with the split-browser model, some of the latency is actually in user-terminal interactions, since the real
query is eﬀectively performed from the relay itself.
Jean-Charles Gre´goire et al. / Procedia Computer Science 5 (2011) 601–609 609
Computation costs. The split-browser reduces the load of Alice’s device, which is helpful for handhelds, but increases
the load on the relay, which executes some of the browser’s functions. We have yet to assess how signiﬁcant this can
be for typical LBS services.
In practice, this could limit the number of clients a relay could support simultaneously. The load is however lower
than virtual solutions and does allow to share the load with the user’s machine, which runs the visualization engine.
7. Conclusions
In this project we have proposed ALPINe, a relay-based system for making requests from location based services
without revealing identity. Our system also allows Alice to maintain her usual browsing routine and appear to be at
home. We have proposed a detailed implementation based on Webkit2 that separates browser functionality and allows
the diﬀerent components to run on Alice’s machine and on the relay’s.
Although our system has a central server, and thus the issues that brings, it allows Alice to trust a single entity
instead of a variety of location based servers, and to establish a reputation with that entity. Our approach results
in Alice being able to make local queries, yet keep her cookie history without having it reveal her identity to the
location based service. It further results in Alice also being able to use a proxy to make home-based queries that
approximate her usual query pattern. Our approach avoids the necessity of k other proximate users that are required
for k-anonymous systems. It also has the beneﬁt of allowing the relays and Alice participate in an altruistic, but
mutually beneﬁcial, scheme that “beats the system” and appeals to the activist user.
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